UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
_______________DISTRICT OF TEXAS
_____________ DIVISION				

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	     §
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V.	                                                            §		NO. _________________
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_________________	                           §	

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS WITH 
INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

TO THE HONORABLE _________________, JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE ______________ DISTRICT OF TEXAS:
		
	Defendant ________________, by and through his undersigned attorney, and files this motion to suppress all physical evidence and oral statements obtained as a result of the unlawful stop of his vehicle.
I.  INTRODUCTION
	At ________________________,  Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) Trooper ______________ stopped ___________ while he was driving his pickup truck on Interstate Highway (IH-35) in Frio County, Texas.  The trooper told ____________ that he had been stopped because his rear license plate was “obstructed” in violation of Texas law.  After _____________________ exited the vehicle at the trooper’s request and responded to a series of questions, the trooper asked for _____________________’s consent to search the vehicle.  The officer then instructed _____________________ to follow him to a body shop, where his vehicle was dismantled.  The officers subsequently found marijuana in the gas tank, and _____________________ was arrested. 
	The purported “obstruction” of the plate was also the reason given for the stop in the written DPS reports filed after the arrest.1  The physical evidence–photographs taken of _____________________’s truck at the time the officer stopped him–show, however, that the license plate was not obstructed.2  Because _____________________ was not in violation of the Texas Transportation Code, the trooper lacked an objective basis for the stop.  Without an objective basis to stop _____________________, the trooper’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, and the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful search of his vehicle and the ensuing conversations with police must be suppressed as the “fruits” of the unlawful stop. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).  _____________________ moves to suppress these fruits, including statements made by him to law enforcement officers, on the grounds that:
	1.   There was no basis for the state trooper to stop _____________________ for an “obstructed” license plate.
	2.   Any investigative detention resulting from this traffic stop exceeded the permissible limits of the stop and rendered it an illegal seizure.
	3.   The Government has failed to comply with the requirements of warning of Constitutional rights and assurance of voluntary waiver of these rights preceding custodial interrogation.
 	II.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
	The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.  As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); United States v. Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 423 (5th Cir. 2002) (same). This rule gives law enforcement officers “broad leeway” to conduct seizures “regardless of whether their subjective intent corresponds to the legal justification for their actions.”  United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999).  The “flip-side of that leeway” is that “the legal justification must be objectively grounded.” Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288 (citing United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998)).  
	Thus, a trooper's subjective, but incorrect, belief that a motorist is in violation of state traffic laws is insufficient to justify a stop of a vehicle. Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 423; Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288.  When the supposed traffic infraction that formed the basis for the vehicular stop in fact was not a violation of state law, there is no objective basis for probable cause justifying the stop. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288 (citing Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279); accord United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (stop made upon mistaken view of the law was not objectively reasonable). 
The Initial Stop of Mr. _____________________’s vehicle was Unlawful.
	Officer ____________ did not have probable cause to stop _____________________’s truck. _____________________’s licence plate was not obstructed in violation of Texas law pertaining to the display of license plates.  Section 502.409 of the Texas Transportation Code, in relevant part, makes it a criminal offense to display a license plate that:	
					. . .
(5) has letters, numbers, or other identification marks that because of blurring or reflective matter are not plainly visible at all times during daylight;
(6) has an attached illuminated device or sticker, decal, emblem, or other insignia that is not authorized by law and that interferes with the readability of the letters or numbers on the plate or the name of the state in which the vehicle is registered; or
(7) has a coating, covering, or protective material that:
			(A) distorts angular visibility or detectability; or
(B) alters or obscures the letters or numbers on the plate, the color of the plate, or another original design feature of the plate. . .

Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 502.409.3  
	The Government, in this case, has indicated  to defense counsel that it intends to argue that  Mr. _____________________’s license plate violated this provision because the trailer hitch or “bumper ball” affixed to the vehicle obscured the plate’s readability.  See Exhibit 3 (photographs of the license plate as it appeared at the time of the vehicle stop).  This theory must fail for two reasons.  First, it is clear from the photograph that the trailer hitch does not obscure the plate’s readability.  In fact, the spacing of the letters and numbers on the plate allows for a center placed trailer hitch, which enables the truck to readily perform its hauling function without obstructing the readability of the license plate.  Second, the trailer hitch is not one of the specifically enumerated items that are prohibited by the statute.  As the Fifth Circuit has recently made clear, the Court must “strictly construe” the Texas Transportation Code in analyzing whether a license plate violated Texas law.  Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 424 (citing United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998)).  
	In Granado, the Fifth Circuit reversed the denial of a motion to suppress, in which the district court ruled that a license plate frame, that partially obscured the name of the issuing state, violated the “obstructed plate” provision. 302 F.3d 421, 423.  In reversing that determination, the court of appeals parsed the language of the “obstructed plate” statue. Id. at 424. The Fifth Circuit held that Granado’s license plate frame was not one of the specifically prohibited items: it did not constitute “blurring matter,” “sticker, decal, or other insignia,” or “coating, covering, or protective material” detailed in the statue. Id.  The court of appeals noted that the “statute is specific in what it prohibits and the district court erred in construing it more liberally.” Id.
	Just as Granado’s license plate frame is not one of the enumerated items prohibited by the statute, nor is the trailer hitch affixed to Mr. _____________________’s vehicle.4  It is not an “attached illuminated device or sticker, decal, emblem, or other insignia,” nor is it a “blurring or reflective matter,” coating, covering, lining, or protective material.  And, just as in Granado, the statute must be enforced as written, not as the Government or a single DPS officer would like it to be written.  See Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 424 (declining “to stretch the meaning of the word ‘insignia’ to include a license plate frame).5 
	For these reasons, Mr. _____________________ maintains that he was not in violation of §502.409, and Officer ____________, thus, did not have an objective basis to stop him.  All evidence derived from an illegal search or seizure must be suppressed, unless the government shows there was a break in the chain of events sufficient to refute the inference that the evidence was the product of the Fourth Amendment violation. Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 424 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602-04 (1975)).  The totality of the circumstances must be examined, focusing especially on (1) the temporal proximity of the violation and the discovery of the evidence or statement; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the initial misconduct. Id.  
	In this case, each of these factors weigh in favor of suppression.  The drugs found in _____________________’s vehicle as well as his statements, derived directly and immediately from the unlawful stop.  _____________________’s consent to search the vehicle was not an independent intervening event because it followed within close temporal proximity of that stop.  See Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 280.  The trooper’s tight control over _____________________, including his ordering _____________________ out of his vehicle, and his continuous questioning are additional factors showing that any consent to search that may have been given was tainted by, and not independent of, the unlawful stop. Mr. _____________________’s statements also were temporally related to the illegal search and detention.  Cf. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691, 694 (1982) (statements made six hours after illegal arrest); Brown, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (statements made less than two hours after illegal arrest).  Because there was insufficient attenuation of the taint of the illegal detention, this evidence must be suppressed.  Brown, 422 U.S. 590, 602–04.  Finally, the violation of _____________________’s  Fourth Amendment rights was flagrant.  Stopping a suspect without probable cause or reasonable suspicion is the very sort of law enforcement behavior that the exclusionary rule is meant to discourage.  For all these reasons, the drugs found in the vehicle _____________________ drove, as well as his statements, must be suppressed.  See Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 424 (ordering suppression).
PRAYER
	WHEREFORE, premises considered, _____________________ prays this Honorable Court will set this motion for a pretrial evidentiary hearing and thereafter suppress from use at trial the fruits of the illegal traffic stop, including any statements of Defendant; and any sense impressions perceived by the state troopers officers and other government agents; and all other physical evidence thereby discovered as a result of this stop on July 21, 2004. 

						Respectfully submitted.
						____________________									Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
	I certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendant’s Motion to Suppress with Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support, on ____________________, United States Attorney for the ______________ District of Texas (Attn: Assistant United States Attorney ___________) by courier it to his office at _____________________, on ____________________.

						
						Attorney For Defendant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
_____________ DISTRICT OF TEXAS
__________________ DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	     §
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V.	                                                            §		NO. _______________________
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 _____________________                             §	

O R D E R

	On this date came on to be considered _____________________’s Motion to Suppress, and the Court having heard evidence adduced thereon is of the opinion said motion should be GRANTED.
	It is therefore ordered that the following evidence be, and it is hereby suppressed upon trial of this case:
	1.  Any oral and written statements made by the _____________________ to law enforcement officers after his July 21, 2004, traffic stop.
	2.  Any and all evidence obtained directly or indirectly, through the unlawful stop.
	So ORDERED on this the                      day of _______________.

						
						United States District Judge

							

DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT 5